How To Spot E-Vote Tampering?

Precinct Election Judge writes "I am one of the Republican Party Precinct Chairs in Harris County, Texas. Since in 2006 Republican Rick Perry won the Governor's race in my precinct I will be the head election judge at my polling station this November. (My Democratic counterpart will be assistant election judge.) I have read with interest the stories about voting machine hacking, and I want advice from those of you who are experts on what to watch for to make sure there is no fraudulent activity at my precinct during the election. What activities should I look for? Keep in mind my restrictions: I will be at a table in the front of the room with the voter rolls signing people in, I can only approach the voting machines if a voter asks a question or if I have strong reason to believe there is fraudulent activity, the last thing I need is for someone to say the Republicans are trying to keep people from voting! And finally, although each station and voter will be visible from my seat each machine has 'blinders' around it so I will most likely not be able to see the hands of each voter while they are at the station. Thank you in advance for all suggestions."

Let me be sure I understand....

[llamalad (12917)]

So what you're really asking is what sort of evidence of tampering you should be sure to avoid leaving behind?

Re:Let me be sure I understand....

[MiniMike (234881)]

And there are activist groups that get busted doing it every year, stuffing registration roles, trotting out thousands of dead voters, etc.

Ok, I've seen some inattentive election judges, but how do they get away with that?

Election Judge- Next- you in the wheelbarrow- name?

Dead Voter- . . . .

EJ- Name please?

DV- . . . . . (limb falls off)

EJ- Sir, your name please!

Party Lackey crouching behind wheelbarrow- um, (looks at paper) John Smith, no Joe Smith this time...

EJ- Voting booth #4 Mr. Smith. Please leave your pickaxe and shovel by the door.

Do you have a paper trail?

[bit trollent (824666)]

Does your E-Vote equipment produce a voter verifieable paper trail?

If it doesn't have a paper trail, ask yourself why.

Re:Do you have a paper trail?

[FredFredrickson (1177871)]

Yeah, without a paper trail, the question you should be asking is - how can you spot E-Vote integrity? The answer is: You can't.

Re:Do you have a paper trail?

[SatanicPuppy (611928)]

Ideally the machine should spit out a paper confirming your choices, and you should drop that in a box on the way out the door, after you verify it. Generating a piece of paper that the voter never sees is pointless.

Now, you're probably thinking, "That sounds like a paper ballot system? Why would we pay all this money for these fancy machines when we have to basically fall back on a paper ballot system to make sure they're reliable?"

And that is the real question.

Re:Do you have a paper trail?

[SatanicPuppy (611928)]

Horse. Shit.

Where I live the requirement for electronic voting machines means that poorer areas, who can't afford enough of them have lines that routinely take hours to get through, which damn well disenfranchises people every damn election...Lot of poor people have jobs that are real understanding of a 4-hour "vote break".

Don't even try to sell it on that grounds, because there are people all over this country whose franchise would be a lot easier to exercise if they could just use a pencil and a piece of paper.

Re:Do you have a paper trail?

[TrinSF (183901)]

I'm sorry that's true where you live. I know that when I was growing up, that was certainly a problem, and I know it continues to be. In my county, ALL precincts use the same equipment. There is no variance in equipment depending on area or affluence.

One of the things that happens to me when I work elections is that my voters will say they don't understand why we do this or that thing, because so many of them have never experienced voting disenfranchisement. I always cheerfully explain that while I'm glad they have no experience with it, that the laws and procedures exist because in many places, people don't have the luxury that my voters have. I grew up in the south, and I marched in voting rallies in support of voting rights. I understand what you're speaking of, but I don't think it follows that because *your* county or state isn't using our procedures, our reasons for using the procedures aren't valid.

Re:Do you have a paper trail?

[TrinSF (183901)]

And that's exactly what we have in my county, San Mateo County in California. The voter votes on the electronic system. The system then prints out a paper listing of his ballot, which displays for that voter. The voter must then physically approve that paper display as matching his/her vote choices. Only after the voter has verified the paper matches his/her intent, then the voter finally casts his/her ballot.

The paper ballots are on a roll that is held in a secure paper trail unit, which is sealed with a uniquely coded seal that cannot be disturbed from the time the unit is certified prior to election day until the unit is returned for verification and tallying. If the seal is broken or disturbed, that unit is immediately reported for auditing, etc.

When I am assisting voters, I make sure to highlight that the paper vote that displays is the "paper trail" they have heard about, and that to ensure their vote's integrity, they should be careful to seriously check the vote and verify it matches.

That's the hard part

[CastrTroy (595695)]

That's the hard part about e-voting. It's hard to tell when something fraudulent is happening. With pen and paper, human counted voting, it's easy to watch to ballot box to ensure it's empty when you start, that no extra votes are deposited, and that all votes are counted properly. With computers, it's hard for people to actually watch and see what's going on. You could probably swap out the entire insides of a voting machine, make it work completely differently, yet look exactly the same, without anybody noticing.

How To Spot E-Vote Tampering?

[yo303 (558777)]

If the machine says Diebold on it, there's a good chance it has been tampered with.

Re:How To Spot E-Vote Tampering?

[Dracos (107777)]

Remember: Diebold changed their name to Premier Election Systems last year.

Just like the movies!

[pwnies (1034518)]

Look for the flashing lights and sudden appearances of 3d interfaces - because everyone knows that hacking is just like it appears in the movies [imdb.com]

Re:Just like the movies!

[QUILz (1043102)]

And people bringing in 5 PDAs and some laptops with wires hanging out of them, shouting: "Just give me ONE more minute!"

First step is easy:

[Em Adespoton (792954)]

1. What kind of equipment will you be using?
There are a number of models which have been shown to be tamperable with no evidence of tampering available at the time of voting. Step 1 is to make sure you aren't using any of these machines.

Malfunction bigger threat than Hacking. Seal it!

[by Anonymous Coward]

I think you should be more concerned with malfunctioning e-voting systems, in particular situations where the voter believes his/her vote has been recorded as intended, but the final tallies do not reflect the voter's intent.

A good way to achieve this is to have a verifiable record of the votes cast.

As far as hacking, you should probably seal the machines with strong tape, including any keyholes, ports, access panels. This would make it easier for you to detect someone tampering with a machine, due to the increased effort required to do so. It also would make it more difficult to tamper with the machine without leaving a trace.

Re:Malfunction bigger threat than Hacking. Seal it

[CastrTroy (595695)]

Even worse is having too many machines being broken, or not enough machines to begin with, so voters have to wait hours in line, and many just end up leaving after deciding it's not worth it.

Not you

[WindBourne (631190)]

The system is set-up to PREVENT voters from fraud. Even on the electronics, it is set-up. Any issue will almost certainly be out of your control. The real problem with the electronics is that the COMPANY who built and service it can commit fraud. And it is next to impossible to detect. All a politician has to do is pay off somebody up high and then the company will do things like last minute software updates in warehouses, that were post inspection. Sadly, it is easy to do.

Re:Not you

[Andy Dodd (701)]

In addition - In most cases the suspicion is not that someone randomly walked in and tampered with the election, but that an election official (such as the person who submitted this to Ask Slashdot) tampered with the election.

Sad to say it to the submitter, but for many people "Republican" and "E-Voting" instantly casts suspicions of tampering for a wide variety of reasons, including but not limited to significant monetary connections between Diebold (now PES) and the Republican party and a claim from someone from Diebold that they would "deliver the election" or something like that.

So, sadly, the question as a Republican election coordinator is not
"How do I prevent tampering", but it is
"How can I prove that the election was not tampered with" and "How can I prove that *I* did not tamper with the election"

How? I'm not sure, but based on other requirements a voter-verifiable paper trail is the first step, and not using Diebold/PES is the second (although there is lots of evidence that most other E-Voting vendors are not giving any thought to security whatsoever.)

First indicator

[TRRosen (720617)]

Bush wins.

You won't see most of the fraud

[Dracos (107777)]

The most egregious fraud on electronic voting machines is completely out of your control, and most likely happens out of sight of any precinct level election official: in the software that is installed on the machines. Unless you have the authority and knowledge to inspect many thousands of lines of code on each machine, you are powerless in this regard.

However, most machines have some type of USB, SD card, or other hardware interface that might be protected with some type of tamper proofing, like the foil seals on aspirin bottles. This is probably beyond your authority to put in place, though.

The only thing you can do is pay attention to the tabulations, if you get to see them.

I recommend you watch Hacking Democracy for insight on what to watch for.

Black Box Voting Org

[OzPeter (195038)]

In all fairness to the /. crowd, I'd say that the best place to ask this question would be the forums of http://www.blackboxvoting.org/ [blackboxvoting.org] From what I have read of their analysis of previous elections I would guess that they have seen it all before.

Just ask the votes

[pieterh (196118)]

There is a standard, well developed way to determine if a ballot has been rigged. Tampering with e-voting machines is just the most modern technique, in the past people have stuffed ballot boxes or simply lied about the results. Easy stuff.

So, standard solution: ask the people as they leave the polling station.

This is called an "exit poll" and it's remarkably accurate. Except of course in the last couple of elections in the USA, where the exit polls utterly failed, especially in districts that had new shiny e-voting machines with no paper trail.

Pay Attention to Low Tech Fraud

[Sponge Bath (413667)]

Your post's enumeration of duties seems the best place to focus your efforts. Checking IDs and sign in sheets, preventing voter intimidation, and generally keeping a lid on procedure seems more important than being distracted by the possibility of a subtle electronic scam. Electronic fraud would most likely have been done to the machines before you get to see them and would be undetectable if done right. If done wrong, it will probably just look like a broken machine.

before, during, after

[beegle (9689)]

I think it's important to realize that voting machines are so insecure that preventing fraud entirely is impossible. That said,

1) Ensure that the machines are physically safe before the election. Don't leave them in an insecure area between the time that you check them to ensure that the counts are at zero (and DO check that) and the time that voting begins. Allow nobody near the machines without both ID and a witness at all times, including yourself (you don't want to be accused of anything), ESPECIALLY if they claim to work for the company that makes the machines. In fact, if anyone you don't know shows up to work on the machines, get approval from as far up the chain of command as can be managed and WRITE DOWN the name, time, etc. if it happens. Consider some sort of tamper-evident seal for the area where the machines are stored (your local trucking company can provide you with a handful of the ones that they use on freight trailers).

2) Watch for voters who are holding either memory cards or keys. The best-publicized ways of messing with a machine involve unlocking the machine and/or inserting a card with altered data. Keep in mind that the memory cards can be a lot smaller than those giant plastic cases around some of the official cards. Also keep in mind that if you see this, it might just be somebody with a spare memory card for their camera and a set of car keys.

3) After the polls close, physical access becomes a big deal again. Don't allow anyone near the machines or cards without ID and a witness, including yourself. Ensure that the machines are locked away, and find out who has a copy of the key to the room/closet/truck/whatever.

Good sources of Info.

[Irvu (248207)]

I'm assuming that you have the Hart InterCivic system as stated by The Verifier [verifiedvoting.org]. In that event, as other authiors have noted you may have no hope of detecting truly electrionic tampering. However you may spot some things. The links below also apply to Diebold and ES&S systems as well.

I would be sure, to tell all voters to read the confirmation screen carefully. Many other locations have reported instances of vote switching where voters, once they reach the closing screen, see a different outcome than they pushed. Evidence from a Rice University study indicates that less than 30% of people even read this screen but those that do have reported nontrivial numbers of flipped votes.

Secondly I would educate yourself about the machines. Ohio's Everest study [state.oh.us], particularly chapter 14 [state.oh.us] contains many scary things about the machines. Some you can look for, many you cannot.

You will also find information from the California study [ca.gov] notably the red-team reviews of the hart system.

Voters Unite is also a source of some good info As does [votersunite.org]Pollworkers.us [pollworker.us] which is a useful site for those working the polls.