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Encryption Security IT

Whole Disk Encryption For Vista? 125

Q7U writes "After reading about several laptop thefts and losses, my boss wants me to set up whole disk encryption for her Vista travel laptop. After doing some research, it seems she has three options: Bitlocker (part of Vista Ultimate), PGP Whole Disk Encryption, and TrueCrypt. My main problem now is choosing one. I can't find any comparitive reviews of these products to determine which will be the best choice, so I was hoping the Slashdot crowd could suggest which product they would go with and tell us what they liked about their choice."
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Whole Disk Encryption For Vista?

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  • Fourth option (Score:5, Informative)

    by mvdwege ( 243851 ) <mvdwege@mail.com> on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @04:59PM (#24502819) Homepage Journal

    There's a fourth option: SafeBoot. I recently got the basic Administrator training for the product, and it is very nice. Integrates well with enterprise directory services like AD and LDAP, for central deployment of configs, uses decent well-documented standard crypto algorithms and key exchange protocols, and is very transparent in use. All that you see of the encryption is a password entry on boot, everything else is completely transparent.

    Mart

  • by Toreo asesino ( 951231 ) on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:02PM (#24502867) Journal

    then Bitlocker will work fine. Otherwise you won't have it.

    In fact, on a active directory, you can configure bitlocker for your entire network to automatically encrypt volumes and backup the TPM recovery information to the Active Directory if you so desire - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc766015.aspx [microsoft.com]

    Other than that, TrueCrypt works just as well for standalone machines.

  • Re:Why whole disk? (Score:4, Informative)

    by dlcarrol ( 712729 ) on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:03PM (#24502877)
    Hibernation would leave stuff that is in memory open to inspection.
  • drive crypt (Score:4, Informative)

    by ya really ( 1257084 ) on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:06PM (#24502919)
    They offer total 256bit AES disk encryption with DriveCrypt Plus Pack. It requires pre-boot authetication before you can do anything. It also comes with stronger container encryption, like 1344bit triple blowfish.
  • Truecrypt vote here (Score:2, Informative)

    by BenjiTheGreat98 ( 707903 ) on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:13PM (#24503001)

    I've been happy with Truecrypt. It is easy to use and the performance impact seems to be not that bad. I just make sure to never use sleep mode or anything like that. Just power off and on anytime I use it. I also setup my windows login to automatically log me in. I got tired of typing in one password and waiting for the next password. I figure if someone is good enough to break my truecrypt password then my windows password wouldn't stand a chance, especially if they had decrypted the data.

  • by Deathlizard ( 115856 ) on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:22PM (#24503143) Homepage Journal

    If the Laptop has a TPM chip (many Lenovo Systems do and some Dell's I beleive) Go with something that takes advantage of that hardware. Bitlocker and PGP support it. I'm not too sure about Truecrypt.

    Also, if the Hard drive and laptop supports setting a password (Almost all modern drives do. Most laptops do as well) Set a password. Especially if the Drive itself supports native encryption. This adds an extra layer of protection over software Data encryption. Also keep in mind that Native Hard drive encryption is OS agnostic and is usually faster and better overall than many software encryption packages.

    Although keep in mind that every protection layer adds more complexity and reduces speed. This is especially true when it comes to data recovery. Make sure your boss understands that if something happens to the laptop, especially Hard Drive damage, The Data on the drive should be considered unsalvagable. Keeping a backup in a secure location (Say a Safe in the Main office also encrypted) is a very good idea.

  • by croddy ( 659025 ) * on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:25PM (#24503189)
    Except sometimes, the box says AES and instead you get XOR. [heise-online.co.uk] I'll take LUKS and dm-crypt over that any day of the week.
  • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:31PM (#24503265)

    You may consider Checkpoint Full Disk Encryption (formerly Pointsec).
    http://www.checkpoint.com/products/datasecurity/pc/index.html [checkpoint.com]

  • Re:Why whole disk? (Score:4, Informative)

    by compro01 ( 777531 ) on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:32PM (#24503283)

    In the last decade? Try in the last week. I regularly deal with people with that kind of connection (often CDPD with a high-gain antenna). Far north conservation officers, for example.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:36PM (#24503337)
  • Re:Fourth option (Score:5, Informative)

    by Nos. ( 179609 ) <andrew@th[ ]rrs.ca ['eke' in gap]> on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:38PM (#24503369) Homepage

    We went with Safeboot also, but given the submitter's description, I wouldn't recommend it. Safeboot is nice for an enterprise type rollout, not for one laptop. You really don't want to support the backend infrastructure for one machine.

    Go with TrueCrypt or BitLocker for a one-off.

  • by mlts ( 1038732 ) * on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:39PM (#24503389)

    I use all three, PGP Whole Disk Encryption on one machine, TrueCrypt on another, and one server has a TPM, so it, and its RAID arrays are BitLocker protected.

    Each addresses slightly different security concerns. If you want to encrypt your disk with a password, and that's all you need, any of these will do the trick. If you want a hardware cryptographic token, so a thief can't obtain your encryption key by brute force, go with PGP Whole Disk Encryption, or BitLocker that supports a TPM with PIN functionality.

    BitLocker is probably the easiest to implement, as you just install it, run software to check and partition the root disk. Then, save the recovery key on a USB flash drive (well away from the laptop). You can also save the recovery key on a TrueCrypt volume too. Once Bitlocker is enabled, the security of the machine will be the user passwords (especially any user with Administrator rights.) Make sure you have a decently long (16 characters, preferably more than 20) password to log on with. If you use BitLocker with a PIN and the TPM, you can get away with shorter user passwords if you hibernate or shut down.

    Disadvantage of BitLocker -- Requires a TPM for decently secure functionality. TPM enabled laptops are rare, and desktops are rarer still, unless you explicitly buy a motherboard with one, or a "corporate" desktop.

    TrueCrypt is a very good solution. It is licensed at no charge (donations are recommended), and is very secure. However, its intended for a single user machine. Using multiple passwords with it is kludgy at best. However for a single user, its very secure once enabled, and you burn a TC recovery CD.

    PGP Whole Disk Encryption is the most versatile. It can use a TPM, USB flash drive, smart card, eToken, or none of the above, and use multiple ones in a list to authenticate for a hard disk to work. For example, my laptop has an eToken for hardware security, but as an emergency, I have a very long recovery passphrase if the eToken gets lost or someone locks it by too many guesses. Another example is a friend of mine who has a TPM on his laptop, but if that fails for some reason, he has two eToken keys as backup. PGP Whole Disk has a very good reputation, and is by far best solution for a business IT environment.

    You can't go wrong with any of the three listed.

  • Re:Fourth option (Score:4, Informative)

    by Vancorps ( 746090 ) on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @05:51PM (#24503517)

    There is also VMWare's ACE which gives you all sorts of options. Additionally there are Virtual desktop scenarios which means that all your work data is done in the VM where everything is encrypted. That leaves the host OS for guests to use. If the laptop is stolen then the user only loses the work that they did between the time they were last plugged into the network, VPN connectivity even counts.

    HP and Lenovo both have whole disk encryption options that work at the enterprise level. My primary experience is with HP which allows me to keep a backup key on a couple of USB thumb drives which can be stored in separate locations. Truecrypt as this same ability and both options are transparent to the OS for the most part.

  • by BenEnglishAtHome ( 449670 ) on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @06:11PM (#24503713)

    I have useful experience with three products.

    SecureDoc from WinMagic [winmagic.com] is the software solution we use at my big TLA. As administration headaches go, this one isn't so bad. The recovery processes are workable but not (that I can see) hackable by any thief. The way we have it set up, users get 15 shots at screwing up their machine before IT has to get involved, thus allowing most bozos to eventually get it right while not giving infinite opportunites to thieves. It's administrable over the network (in some ways) and, thus, suitable for big organizations.

    At home, I still have one Windows machine and it's secured with PGP. [pgp.com] I've never used it in a big networked environment so I can't comment on how easy it is to administer. It has one feature that I think is neat, though. You can hit TAB before typing in your passphrase and it will be displayed in clear text. (Normally your pass isn't echoed on screen.) Scoff if you will but on those bad days when I've had little sleep and am, perhaps, a bit hung over, my 59-character passphrase can sometimes be just one hurdle too far. Seeing the text on-screen can be a big help for those times when my head just isn't in the game.

    Finally, hardware encryption is better. When my Windows machine was my primary (I now am almost entirely migrated to an Ubuntu installation that I installed from the alternate CD, enabling full disk encryption from the beginning) computer, I relied happily on Flagstone [flagstonesecure.com] drives. I still have one of their USB Freedom drives for backups. The login schtick is more severe; you get few chances and your data goes bye-bye if you screw up. However, I like the fact that they are a real product, not vaporware like some of the encrypted drives from major manufacturers. You can call them up, give them a credit card number, and actually get the hardware. If you talk to the home office in England, you'll converse with smart, helpful, courteous people. All in all, they're a joy to deal with. Downsides? Prices are high and capacities low, but that's part of the deal when it comes to certified hardware such as they sell. Truly irritating downsides? The documentation, unless they've revised it recently, is not all that it should be. Still, I don't hesitate to recommend them.

  • Re:Why whole disk? (Score:5, Informative)

    by apparently ( 756613 ) on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @06:30PM (#24503905)
    Or, you know tell her that she should not be storing ANY data on her computer. ALL data is to be saved to the network shares for backup control and security. If she needs to access something on the road, use VPN.

    Riiiiiiiiight. Because your solution works really well on airplanes, client-sites w/o internet access, or anywhere else where network access may not be available.

    Good job on coming up with novel solutions to difficult problems. Are you in middle-management by chance?

  • by ad454 ( 325846 ) on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @06:44PM (#24504031) Journal
    At least WinVista and WinXP users have several full disk encryption options, including the opensource TrueCrypt.

    But Mac users are out of luck, since no opensource full disk encryption exists for the MacOSX. Neither TrueCrypt or Apple's FileVault support full disk encryption on MacOSX. The only option is the closed source Check Point Full Disk Encryption [checkpoint.com] product.

    But if it is not opensource, then I personally would not trust it not to have back doors, especially since multinational corporations left-right-and-center have been falling all over themselves to help the US and other governments spy on the general population.
  • by al0ha ( 1262684 ) on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @06:53PM (#24504133) Journal
    As quoted from TrueCrypt, "System encryption provides the highest level of security and privacy, because all files, including any temporary files that Windows and applications create on the system partition (typically, without your knowledge or consent), hibernation files, swap files, etc., are always permanently encrypted (even when power supply is suddenly interrupted)"

    Implements a pre-boot authentication which means the TrueCrypt password has to be entered before the OS boots and can be installed and encrypt of the fly the current OS install and disk.

    More info here: http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=system-encryption [truecrypt.org]

    But remember, your boss must not be afraid of remembering a strong password and must never write it down.

  • by SiriusStarr ( 1196697 ) <SumStultusSedEsQ ... UTom minus punct> on Wednesday August 06, 2008 @08:39PM (#24504959)
    http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/07/30/204241&from=rss [slashdot.org] Just reading that would make me gravitate towards PGP or TrueCrypt.
  • Re:No Comparisons? (Score:2, Informative)

    by bozojoe ( 102606 ) on Thursday August 07, 2008 @01:26AM (#24506731) Journal
  • by greichert ( 464285 ) on Thursday August 07, 2008 @02:12AM (#24506889)
    I had the opportunity to deploy Pointsec on the site I was managing. It went really good, with only minor issues with 2 laptops (out of 20+ computers). They were resolved quite easily and without any loss of data. And BTW I never had any issues with their VPN client either :-) .
  • The answer (Score:3, Informative)

    by duffbeer703 ( 177751 ) on Thursday August 07, 2008 @08:46AM (#24508579)

    Vista Bitlocker is good, but has some issues, as it uses Windows authentication, and not pre-boot. Its two-factor system is kinda weak. If you're a small business worried primarily about casual theft, it's a good solution.

    TrueCrypt has pre-boot authentication, which is much more secure. But its encryption implementation is not necessarily FIPS certified, and to my knowledge the system doesn't have common criteria certification. For a business user, the ability to recover a key/password is minimal... so use with caution.

    PGP/SafeBoot/Pointsec/WinMagic are all commercial FDE applications that work well, but have specific features that matter moer to some people. PGP is nice because its universal server can provide other services like email encryption as well. SafeBoot has robust management, particularly if you are a McAffee AV customer. Pointsec was the only solution that allowed you to force pre-boot authentication after hibernating the PC. They also have a (very expensive) small business option that doesn't require a server. WinMagic has excellent smart-card integration, and integrates well with PKI solutions.

  • Re:Why whole disk? (Score:3, Informative)

    by spinkham ( 56603 ) on Thursday August 07, 2008 @09:17AM (#24508845)

    The problem is that many programs store temporary working copies on the local disk no matter where you store the main file (Microsoft Office, I'm looking at you...).
    If you have data worth stealing, full disk + swapfile encryption is the only way to go.

  • Re:Why whole disk? (Score:3, Informative)

    by compro01 ( 777531 ) on Thursday August 07, 2008 @09:37AM (#24509107)

    Satellite doesn't work too well when you're got a hill or a forest blocking the view.

  • Re:Why whole disk? (Score:3, Informative)

    by slaker ( 53818 ) on Thursday August 07, 2008 @12:39PM (#24511595)

    There are small towns all over the US for which there is nothing but dialup available, sir. Hell, there are small towns where cable TV isn't even available. I realize this may be news to you, but not everybody lives in urban or suburban areas.

    My uncle is director of Public Health for a county in Illinois. The *only reason* which the BFE Small Town near where he lives has even partial DSL access is that his status as a Homeland Security First-Responder was enough to get Verizon off its ass and build a LEC just for him (he is legally required to have "fast" internet service at his home, and telcos are obliged to provide it, apparently).

    The hilarious outcome of this is that there is a tiny (outhouse-size) brick building with a Verizon sign right off the edge of his property, surrounded on all sides by a corn field. My uncle has 3Mbit DSL service and the folks who live just on the edge of the closest town (population 1200) can get 384k or whatever it is. Everyone else there is screwed.

An Ada exception is when a routine gets in trouble and says 'Beam me up, Scotty'.

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