Ask Slashdot: Establishing Procurement Policies Regarding Secure Boot? 104
New submitter Firx writes: My university department has a tradition of selling its used computers and/or repurposing them with Linux for graduate students and science computer labs. With Windows no longer requiring one be able to disable secure boot, my department is writing up a procurement policy to ensure future machines we buy will still have this feature. Part of the draft motion reads: "Be it resolved that computers running or intending to run Microsoft Windows purchased by the
department which boot using the Unified Extensible Firmware
Interface (UEFI) have the ability to disable the Secure Boot features for both local hard drive and
network booting." Is there something further we should be including here and what is the best way to explain the need for this policy to colleagues less technically literate?
Add a test (Score:5, Informative)
Require it, for example, to be installable with Linux with the "current version of the stable Debian installer" at the time of purchase. For an individual contract, that version needs to be specified, of course. This way you have at least somebody to blame if it later turns out this does not work.
Re:Add a test (Score:5, Insightful)
Require it, for example, to be installable with Linux with the "current version of the stable Debian installer" at the time of purchase.
(1) Test1: Netboot to CloneZilla Live Image.
(2) Test2: Boot system from IT Rescue USB Stick
(3) Test3: Debian installer from CD and Boot to OS from hard drive following installation
All 3 tests must pass for each system.
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4. Must both work with Knoppix Live Linux while having MS Windows system installed and adjusting partitions with a Gparted or similar probram.
5 be capable of rewritting hard disc to a Linux system for permanent use.
6 Must allow booting of a Live Linux sytem via USB memory (stick or external hard drive) or via a DVD.
Re:Add a test (Score:5, Informative)
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What if IT doesn't want to bother with the purchase at all? What if all major couuriers including USPS up and quit? What if a solar flare wipes out civilization before it arrives?
I would imagine there would be some sort of requirement listed in the P.O.
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Then I hope very much you do not get any offers.
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So let's say I'm a professor working on research at this university of yours, and I want a new model, or a new configuration, that hasn't been tested at the school before. Do I have to pay for the IT department to buy the first one for testing? Or are you telling me that I just can't buy it because some idiot in IT says they don't want to bother with this test?
Standard practice would have you ordering off a punch list developed by your school's procurement group. In the exceptional case that you need to order something other than the preconfigured models, you would get an exception from testing.
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You obviously have absolutely no experience how this works in the real world. You would, of course, have to write a specific justification. That is already enough to keep th exceptions low.
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So, if you want to go off your list, absolutely no problem? Stupid meaningless list, then.
Yeah, not how it works. The same people who approved the list have to approve your exception. So you need a reason that is more important than the rationale behind the original requirement.
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no, you add it to the procurement request that the provider of the hardware agrees to. then you shouldn't be even offered.
just test it with a live cd, usb stick boot or whatever the fuck you want then afterwards and if it turns out not to run it then use it to twist the arm of the hardware provider to give money back or whatever for not following the contract,
if you absolutely need to have a surface rt for testing or whatever then you're going to be procuring the hardware through other channels anyways.
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One reason companies buy from Dell and HP is that models don't change. I buy a DL380 G9, I get a DL380G8, and I know what it will have onboard. This is why a lot of companies specify certain models and configs, with special exceptions given for items that are not on this list.
Minor updates tend to get enterprise customers very irritable, especially in environments where each computer has to be virtually identical, or else it becomes an administrative nightmare, especially for having parts on hand (usually
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Are you functionally illiterate or just plain stupid? Why do you think I said "For an individual contract, that version needs to be specified, of course."?
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created and deployed by the US
Just out of curiosity, what countries' vendors might be imagined to be potentially safe from inserting such. Iceland? Switzerland? Luxembourg?
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Since all the hardware is inevitably from China, it makes little difference.
Expalnation (Score:5, Insightful)
what is the best way to explain the need for this policy to colleagues less technically literate?
We bought the computers, we should be able to use them as we see fit.
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Re:Expalnation (Score:4, Informative)
what is the best way to explain the need for this policy to colleagues less technically literate?
We bought the computers, we should be able to use them as we see fit.
Would you want a car that only accepts fuel from one gas station company?
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Why?
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Probably because he owns that oil company's stock.
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Would you want a car that only accepts fuel from one gas station company?
This is why car analogies don't work, you have to continuously seek out, purchase and put gas in a car to keep it running meaning that being beholden to one vendor would be extremely cumbersome. You don't have to continously seek out, purchase and install the operating system to keep your computer running.
What you need to do is to make your case for why it matters for a personal computer and re-purposing old systems seems like a valid justification. Because a more appropriate analogy is asking would you wan
Linux can UEFI Boot (Score:5, Informative)
Linux can UEFI Boot with and without Secure Boot. With Secure Boot you have to be able to install keys or use a Grub Shim, but I have seen both Toshiba and HP Laptops boot Mageia and RedHat in UEFI and CSM modes.
Re:Linux can UEFI Boot (Score:4, Insightful)
Oh good grief. Fine.
My mobo allows me to load my own keys. I'm assuming it's not the only UEFI implementation on the face of the planet that allows one to load one's own keys. I'd be secure booting my systemd-free Gentoo install if not for sheer laziness.
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You, maybe. With your current mainboard. Everyone else generally, not so much. So for general distribution other OS distributors are still dependent on a direct competitor to sign their bootcode for them.
Yes, it does indeed mean OS distributors need signatures from a direct competitor. That's fair and reasonable, right? Right?
On top of that, redmond is already slowly turning on the screws. So next upgrade, who knows? Following this and also their earlier business practices, it is not merely conceivable, it
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No, they're not "dependent on a direct competitor". Do you even know how it works?
Mainboard manufacturers and OEMs can put whatever keys they want into their UEFI firmware for Secure Boot.
For Windows 10 certification, Microsoft requires that their keys be included in the signature database and the KEK database. This lets them boot their own code (signature) and add new software signing keys in the future so newer code can run (KEK). There are no restrictions or requirements pertaining to keys for other vend
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On top of that, redmond is already slowly turning on the screws. So next upgrade, who knows?
This is a very legitimate concern, I will admit. It's one reason why updates are disabled on my Windows^H^H^H^H^HArcadeOS 8 install. I was somewhat worried when I learned that UEFI settings can be detected from and changed from an OS.
Re:Linux can UEFI Boot (Score:5, Informative)
Then, how do I recompile a custom kernel and with UEFI Boot and Secure Boot run it?
Depends on how your distro of choice has implemented Secure Boot.
All of the distros with official support are using a shim derived from Red Hat's [github.com]. That shim is a very simple bootloader which maintains compliance with Secure Boot by only chaining on to verified binaries, but it allows the use of an additional public key which has been compiled in to the binary. Anyone who finds it worth the $99 can have their build signed by Microsoft and will then be able to boot anything signed with the associated private key on top of anything signed with the Microsoft keys the system has built in. It also provides a method to pass the public key down the chain so the next stage bootloader, kernel, and beyond can verify with it as well.
Fedora and Ubuntu stop here. Fedora signs GRUB2 with their key which then verifies the kernel, which then verifies the modules. ( http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/12... [dreamwidth.org] ) Ubuntu jumped on a loophole in the wording of the Secure Boot spec to just use their key to sign a bootloader which will then happily launch an unsigned kernel. ( https://lists.ubuntu.com/archi... [ubuntu.com] )
Suse took things a step further and expanded the shim to support a local key list in the UEFI configuration area. ( https://www.suse.com/communiti... [suse.com] ). Now even a system that lacks the ability to add keys to the firmware's verification process can run a fully signed boot process with custom keys.
Finally one of the main original developers on the shim who has since left Red Hat took Suse's key management code, mixed it with his own continued tinkering, and added a user interface that comes up if you attempt to boot a signed binary that doesn't match an approved key, allowing the user to browse for a key on any accessible storage and add it to the system. ( http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/20... [dreamwidth.org] )
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So the answer depends on your distro. If you're running Ubuntu, you just compile your new kernel and go have fun because Ubuntu's not yet verifying the kernel (this is apparently becoming optional in 16.04). If you're running Suse, you use whatever tool they offer to add a key to their shim's list. If you're running Fedora, you replace their shim with one of the other variants and either add a key of your own or just go Ubuntu-style and drop it at the kernel.
Of course this is all assuming your system doesn't allow you to change the keys, which I know is a valid theoretical possibility but I still haven't encountered in the real world.
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Thanks for the detail!
Arch Linux uses EFI BOOT STUB [archlinux.org] which allows you to secure boot with your own keys [archlinux.org] if you like.
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Arch Linux uses EFI BOOT STUB [archlinux.org] which allows you to secure boot with your own keys [archlinux.org] if you like.
Yeah, that's what my last paragraph is about. You can do that or sign any other EFI bootloader you prefer with any OS you prefer if your hardware allows changing your keys and you know how to do it.
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When will we learn that this argument is not good enough for this sort of security boondoggle? The fact it is possible and even probable to happen in the future means it needs safeguards against. Preferrably mathematical safeguards, not just the say-so of a party with considerable market power and no obligation to care for anyone its measures leave out in the cold.
I'm not making an argument, just stating a fact.
That said, what this basically comes down to is the age-old practicality vs. idealism problem. A cryptographically verified boot process, as a basic concept, is beneficial to everyone. Bootkits are a real thing and this is a barrier against them.
If we're going to do this, we run very quickly in to the same usability problem as SSL. Most users don't have any interest in verifying and installing certificates, they just want to use the software they've bought.
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Did you follow a how-to? Any links you'd care to share? Was this part of those distros' installers? I tried to do this with Gentoo but I just don't have the time to learn new things anymore apparently. Thanks in advance
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Note that you cannot build your own kernel, nor is it the case that all distributions have done the work to get their builds signed. Note that not all firmware is required to let you install custom keys either.
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Requiring machines that let you install your own keys sounds like the best options. Secure Boot is actually quite useful for protecting the OS from pre-boot attacks that could otherwise rootkit it. As long as you control it, it's worth having that extra security feature. You could even delete the Microsoft key to prevent students reinstalling Windows.
Tablets? (Score:1)
What about Surface Pro tablets? I think that this policy would preclude their purchase (a good idea IMHO), but others may disagree. You probably need to figure this out before it sinks your attempt to bring in a new policy.
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You are able to disable Secure boot on the x86 Surface tablets, I have it disabled on my first gen Surface Pro. Even the newest ones apparently support disabling it according to Microsoft's documentation on them.
No such luck for the ARM Surface tablets.
Not all computers have UEFI (Score:5, Informative)
You are both over-specifying the mechanism, and scope.
Not all computers you can buy to run Windows have UEFI, and some otherwise useful devices can't disable it.
2 examples that would be excluded from purchase by how you have phrased this :
- Macs (do not have UEFI, but an Apple fork of EFI)
- iPads (locked boot loader)
- Many Windows 10 tablets/hybrids/ultrabooks e.g. Surface (locked boot loader)
- Windows Phone (locked boot loader)
- Sony Playstation (sometimes used as GPU clusters, but have a locked boot loader )
Now if you want to ban those other device types , thats really up to you. It depends on do you consider a tablet to be a computer or a phone to be a computer, but heck. Increasingly , the number of computers that function as you describe are going to go down, and more and more locked down devices like tablets and hybrids will become the norm in the market.
Why not frame it in terms of why :
"The department believes that it is essential to generate long term utility from computers it buys, and that they shouldn't simply be disposable. We believe that long term use requires flexibility in the operating system used on a computer. We believe that long term use can be achieved in multiple ways - such as reselling used devices to other entities that have need for them, re-purposing computers for graduate students and laboratories, or converting computers for use in instrumentation. This means that wherever possible, computers should be purchased ensuring they have the capability to be unlocked from only running Windows, and running other operating systems such as Linux. This ensures maximum flexibility for our department in generating value from the money we invest in our IT hardware. Exceptions to this need to present a business case and be approved by XXXX"
The committee approving the exceptions is the mechanism to handle your other options.
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It's also worth pointing out that there's a lot of devices which allow the bootloader to be unlocked, but then are no longer covered by the manufacturer's warranty. These should be avoided.
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"This ensures maximum flexibility for our department in generating value from the money we invest in our IT hardware."
That's a big fat loophole. Microsoft and Apple create special deals with universities to "create value". When administrators argue with academics in front of people with budgets and motivated salespeople, it will not go well.
"We leased 1000, Ipad ++ Desktop Education edition machines for the physics lab. All students now require Apple IDs and must agree to EULAs as part of their acade
Why mention Windows? (Score:4, Informative)
Other than pure FUD, why mention Windows or Microsoft at all? We have hundreds of servers running Linux that have Secure Boot enabled, and our requirements for the next gen of servers is that the Secure Boot can not be disabled. So don't pretend it is just a 'Windows' thing.
Dragging MS into it is really childish. A manufacturer that gets a Windows 10 cert has the choice of allowing Secure Boot to be disabled or not. Are you trying to claim that a manufacturer who DOESN'T get an MS certification is somehow prevented from that option?
Re:Why mention Windows? (Score:4, Informative)
Who signed it? We did. And anyone who has the passwords required to access the UEFI does not have physical access to the servers without accompanied.
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You were simply lucky that your secure boot machines shipped in "setup" mode. You can't sign your bootloader if they ship in "user" mode. Microsoft allows OEMs to do this for Windows 10.
Re:Why mention Windows? (Score:4, Interesting)
Simple. Microsoft Corporation holds the keys to your Secure Boot chain of trust. Or did you manage to get someone else to sign your bootloader?
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The only reason MS has the keys is because everyone else is too lazy to do it right. We sign our own images, and our key is the only one that will boot.
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False. The reason why MS has the keys is that to have your product certified to run on Windows, this is a must. Same with TPM + TCG 2.0. It was only due to good negotiators on RedHat's part that MS allows their OS to boot, -period- on Secure UEFI computers.
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I haven't seen a UEFI that did NOT let you modify the list of permitted signing keys.
My guess is that Dell and other major OEMs don't let you, but if you require that amount of customization you may as well BE the OEM and build your own, choosing a decent mobo.
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Dell allows you to use your own keys in the BIOS, at least on a precision workstation from mid-2015, and I assume everything after.
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Then can somebody point to a desktop mobo that does uefi secure boot and doesn't give the end user key management capabilities?
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The whole point of this article is that Microsoft used to require all motherboard to allow the user to add their own keys. That is no longer the case. Expect non-user changeable keys in the near future and mandated locked UEFI a couple years after that. Desktop computers will become as locked down as mobile phone. Their mouths are watering at the prospect of renting everyone their computer, but the change needs to be gradual enough that users won't fight back. Tons of people were saying secure boot was
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So it's FUD, then?
The Taiwanese mobo brands will be churning out mobos with configurable secure boot and PS/2 ports for longer than you care about it.
Re:Why mention Windows? (Score:5, Interesting)
Are you trying to claim that a manufacturer who DOESN'T get an MS certification is somehow prevented from that option?
I think you misread the question. The question was about requirements for purchasing products from vendors, not telling vendors what they are and arn't allowed to do. (That's Microsoft's job)
There's nothing childish about mentioning Microsoft explicitly. They were the ones that championed Secure Boot in the first place, forcing OEMs to implement it for certification. Most major linux vendors have the resources to get their boot keys into the database, but smaller distros probably wouldn't.
Even then, the database is then stored locally in the UEFI, so if there's a Linux distro that's late to the party, they're still screwed with the current generation of hardware unless a bios update is released.
Additionally, Windows 8 certification mandated that it must be possible to disable Secure Boot (after significant outcry about possible lock-in). But for Windows 10 certification that requirement has been quietly dropped again, once again raising that concern about lock-in.
The submitter has stated that their guidelines will require any new hardware to have the ability to disable SecureBoot, certification requirement or not.
The question is, how do you explain that to people who may not understand the technical nuances.
The easiest way I can think of, is to make sure the hardware provides the ability to install Windows 7 (Just because Windows 10 licensing permits downgrade rights, it doesn't follow the hardware will let you), which doesn't support SecureBoot. If you can install Windows 7, you can anything else you want.
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Because initially (and after much bad press) Microsoft wrote in to the specification that you must be able to disable Secure Boot and you must be able to add your own keys to the firmware.
They then changed things to remove the requirement to allow either of these things. This will necessarily lead to machine which can only boot via Secure Boot and only boot using binaries signed using certificate bought from MS. The fact that MS could prevent the competition booting either by refusing to provide a key or pr
Keep it generic (Score:1)
As mobile devices and desktops eventually share more in common, it's not unlikely that we'll soon see locked bootloaders on PCs, probably starting with netbook like laptops. I would be more general/generic in the terms.
"Be it resolved that devices running pre-installed operating systems purchased by the department must have the ability to boot third-party software from local storage, or network if no local storage exists."
Why mention "Windows" at all? + exclusions (Score:1)
"Be it resolved that computers ... purchased by the department which boot using the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) have the ability to disable the Secure Boot features for both local hard drive and network booting."
I would also explicitly exclude "special purpose" computers that your department may purchase for other purposes (e.g. computers that run security cameras, which you may WANT to be locked-down), provided the individual purchase is approved by a review board. I would also allow the
Put it in the budget (Score:5, Insightful)
For computers that can be re-purposed or re-sold, the actual residual value after 3 years (or whatever your "time to fully depreciated" is) significantly greater than zero.
For "locked down" computers, the actual residual value becomes a cost - the cost of having it hauled off as e-waste.
In cases where computers must be locked-down (e.g. due to a grant requirement), the "true cost" should be the buy-in cost + the ongoing maintenance cost - the residual cost (or ... + the disposal cost).
By explicitly calling this out in your requisition process, it will make people think twice before applying for grants that require locked-down computers.
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This brings up a really interesting issue regarding ownership of the computers. Legally, grantees do not own equipment purchased under a grant, but are by tradition (if an academic institution) given custodianship of the equipment at the end of the grant.
Sale or re-purposing of the equipment as the department is doing may technically be a violation of federal contracting laws (not that anyone will enforce it...).
Demonizing Secure Boot. (Score:2)
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Secure boot is actually a worth a lot less than most people think. In most cases it will cause more hassle than security increase. It is basically an attempt to lock PCs to Windows (eventually), not an attempt to make users more secure. The idea is that when Joe Ordinary tries to install Linux, additional problems surface and he will give up.
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Excellent example. And by the time they were called to task in court, DR-DOS was dead, despite being a vastly superior product.
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That is nonsense and I think you know it. At least, I hope you know it, as the alternative makes you look much worse...
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Nice emotional manipulation approach. Of course entirely invalid and unsophisticated in addition. And, quite frankly, if my expert opinion looks bad to you, then
1) that says certain pretty bad things about you and
2) I do not care. At all. I do _not_ want to be part of your club-of-morons.
There are enough morons out there with no clue about security that are also Dunning-Kruger sufferers, i.e. they have no clue how clueless they are.
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Indeed. Another excellent argument. If this really was about making users more secure, then there would be a _lot_ of places where that time and effort would have done a lot more good. Hence this clearly is not about making the user more secure. And then we can pretty directly conclude that it is some weak form of DRM, intended to give them more control over the platform.
Security implications (Score:2)
Every year at security conferences, more and more people are showing that once something gets into the secure boot area, it won't ever leave. Nearly every bit of anti-malware in the world won't even detect if something is running in the secure area. Being able to disable it is a security feature. Being able to remove or replace it is even better.
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Indeed. and the reason for that is that it is actually not an attempt to make users and systems more secure. It is an attempt to eventually make anything except Windows problematic or impossible to install. User benefits are somewhere between zero and negative.
Fixed that for you (Score:3)
Hello,
I would suggest the following amendment to your draft text:
Be it resolved that computers running or intending to run Microsoft Windows purchased by the department which boot using the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) have the ability to disable the Secure Boot feature." REMOVING: s for both local hard drive and network booting.
If you want to put in verbiage saying Secure Boot should be disabled, the language should reflect this in its entirety, not just for what types of devices the computer boots from. Example: A manufacturer who disabled booting from SSDs, USB flash drives or optical media would still be in spec with your requirements, since you only specified hard disk drives and PXE booting in your text.
Also, keep in mind your requirement is not going to work with Windows 10 Mobile devices (phones, phablets and the like) as UEFI with Secure Boot enabled is part of the requirements for devices running that edition of Windows 10.
Regards,
Aryeh Goretsky
Why not just buy Linux computers? (Score:2)
I don't understand why the university doesn't simply purchase Linux computers from a major vendor like System76? Save money on costly Microsoft licenses by keeping as many machines as possible running Linux and only install Windows where necessary. If negotiated contracts are a factor, then purchase Linux systems from Dell or HP. They do sell them, you know?!
Become literate about Secure Boot (Score:1)
> what is the best way to explain the need for this policy to colleagues less technically literate?
Secure Boot prevents your boot process from being hijacked. Why would you want to disable that?
With shim and/or preloader and you can Secure Boot any OS that has a UEFI bootloader.
Avoid computers with a Win 10 sticker (Score:2)
"Windows 10 hardware must support Secure Boot and won't have to let you turn it off." - or that sticker can't be used.
http://arstechnica.com/informa... [arstechnica.com]