


Darkmail Attacks - The Next Network Threat? 58
An anonymous reader wonders: "SC Magazine are running an article on the growth of so called Dark Mail Attacks. Whitedust Security appear to have identified this as a potential problem way back in December 2004. Since that time, a marked increase in attacks of this nature, including the recent attacks on the UK Government infrastructure, have been recorded. Are these types of attack a new large scale threat or just a passing fad?"
Spearphishing? Darkmail? Honeypot? (Score:4, Funny)
Re:Spearphishing? Darkmail? Honeypot? (Score:4, Funny)
Attacks (Score:2, Funny)
Teach a man to Phish and he will pheed himself for life .
Close up the vulnerabilities and he he will starphe
Spammers abandoning spam? (Score:3, Insightful)
Seems incongruous to declare "spammers are turning their back on the spam business" in an article about a malicious new "brute force" spamming scheme that has grown "400 percent in the last twelve months according to a report from email filtering company Email Systems."
And and what does the writer of TFA base this notion, anyway? That one spammer (Richter) has been spam-free for six months?
Where's the beef?
Re:Spammers abandoning spam? (Score:2)
It's just that "dictionary attacks" of hundreds of thousands of to: addresses are being used on smaller domains with more frequency.
Same problem, same methods. Spammers are just casting a bigger net, as their success rates are diminishing due to filtering.
Re:Spammers abandoning spam? (Score:2)
Egress Filtering (Score:3, Interesting)
Honestly, the thing that gets me is that most firewalls block incoming, but allow all outgoing traffic. Why? Do you want the next virus to hit and email out as an attachment your word documents? They might have trade secrets, or your budget numbers, etc. Do they want an inside machine setting up a "hole" in the firewall to a IRC server? once they establish the connection from the inside, most firewalls will then ignore the stream. Force spammers to use real mail servers so that they can be appropriately blocked.
I have never had someone give me an intelligent reason on why outgoing port 25 should not be blocked. I've heard the argument about people running email on their broadband connections. (I do, and route outgoing through my ISP's SMTP relay server)
Re:Egress Filtering (Score:2)
Re:Egress Filtering (Score:2)
It's set up as a transparent proxy, and I have no issues with it. It's especially nice when reloading something on another computer, because it's in the corporate cache.
If done right, I can see lots of good reasons for an ISP to set up a transparent web proxy. (Most of those reasons are to reduce ba
Re:Egress Filtering (Score:1)
Re:Egress Filtering (Score:1)
I don't so don't "make an ASS of U and ME" (Score:1)
The m
Re:I don't so don't "make an ASS of U and ME" (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:I don't so don't "make an ASS of U and ME" (Score:2)
What I additionally hate pretty tremendously is people who blanket-block mail from dynamic IPs. Many of us don't _want_ to send mail over our ISP's broken server, and we don't _want_ to pay their obscene IP rental "tax" for a fixed IP. I think this is ridiculous.
A combination of keyword filtering, greylisting, ORBLs and rate limiting is far more effective--we even found that rate limiting APNIC IPs to 2 messages per minute per IP does wonders for our spam loads (and this is at a three letter
Re:I don't so don't "make an ASS of U and ME" (Score:2)
Re:I don't so don't "make an ASS of U and ME" (Score:2)
This, coming from an Anon Coward
Priceless.
Re:Indeed (Score:2)
So true...and this axiom can be applied to other entities as well...RIAA/MPAA for example. It's all economics.
My Client Emails (Score:3, Insightful)
Having port 25 open on an outgoing connection isn't that big of a deal if you monitor and control it. Virus scan both ways, rate limit max connections, etc.
Re:My Client Emails (Score:2)
They'd also get the benefit of knowing that you (or other companies they do on-site business with) can't snoop their e-mail.
Re:My Client Emails (Score:3, Insightful)
There is one school of thought which says that permitting open access to your internal network to machines that are not under your control is a potential recipe for disaster and might well compromise all your nice firewalling work that you have done (it's not called a trusted network for nothing)
The solution to this is to have a DMZ zone which untrusted clients are allowed to connect on which may have outgoing SMTP enabled, and keep your trusted network as exactly that. No more spam bots, no more email-l
Re:My Client Emails (Score:2)
Is that something like an automated ATM machine?
Re:My Client Emails (Score:2)
1) They are sending a complete message, which just needs to be routed. This could be sent through your smtp server (port 25) just as easily as through their company server.
2) They are actually doing a mail submission, so that the mail will be "From" theircompany.com. This should be on port 587 using secure authentication.
So no reason not to block port 25.
Re:Egress Filtering (Score:1)
I think that the best thing to do would be to call a cleric to turn all the zombies in your company.
This would force the evil cleric spammers to stop rebuking your zombies...
Although I like your idea of checking the logs, this would tell which machines need a visit from a tech (hmmm... cleric)
Re:Egress Filtering (Score:2)
I run an SMTP server and resent your saying it should be filtered by my ISP. I don't send spam and don't want someone intervening in my email. Get the distributors of bad email not the innocents.
No surprise (Score:3, Interesting)
Basically, spam is an economic problem. Attempts at a technological solution usually involve filtering spam. Since a filter can never be 100% accurate, as filters are deployed the volume of spam increases. So basically, filters "work" as long as most people aren't using them; once they become widespread, the spam volume goes up and up until the network collapses under the bandwidth load (or we try a different approach).
As I conclude in my article, attempting to analyze logically from first principles, the only type of solution which will work is an economic one. Unfortunately, most people dismiss economic solutions out of hand. They're too attached to the fundamentally broken economic model of today's e-mail.
Ironically, the same people often express surprise that the RIAA can't see how broken their economic model is...
Re:No surprise (Score:2, Insightful)
First, it doesn't really solve the zombie spambot problems. Spammers don't seem to care if they break the law or not, provided they don't get caught. A large amount of spam already comes from zombie PCs, and your proposal wouldn't change that. The only thing that would change is some poor slob would end up with a $500 internet bill every now and then. Since it's unlikely the
Re:No surprise (Score:2)
For #2, the same argument could be made as to the impossibility of credit card payments. Somehow, we found a way.
"Trusted" computing doesn't solve anything, because there's no way you'll ever get it to be ubiquitous and mandatory. I'd go back to setting up a UUCP network with my friends before I'd agree to Trusted Computing as a condition of TCP/IP e-mail access.
Re:No surprise (Score:2)
Re:No surprise (Score:2)
As for spammers becoming ISPs--that has already happened. But no, my article explains why the payment has to go to the end user, not the ISP. (Though one option would be for the ISP to take a cut.)
Re:No surprise (Score:2)
And please don't say there will be a foolproof authentication scheme. If there were such a thing, we could just use it for free mail and skip the payments, right?
Re:No surprise (Score:1)
Not really new. (Score:1, Informative)
Even if your spam filtering has ach
Re:Not really new. (Score:2)
Re:pundits behind the times as usual (Score:2)
Not a fad (Score:2)
Especially hilarious are mails from admin@mydomain telling me that my account has just been suspended..
Re:Not a fad (Score:2)
You should be able to save a lot of bandwidth that way.
Having said that, I use dozens of different email addresses on my domain (generally one per sign-up &c.) so this doesn't work so well for me...
Re:Not a fad (Score:2)
Defeat "darkmail" through "greytrapping" (Score:4, Informative)
Basically, you configure spamdb to greylist [openbsd.org] unknown senders, and provide it with a huge list of "spamtrap" addresses, which are invalid email addresses not actually used in your domain.
GREYTRAPPING
Any source which tries to email to a spamtrap address is temporarily blacklisted, just like how SpamCop's SCBL reacts to a message to a spamtrap.
Recent enhancements to 'pf' [openbsd.org] provide for rate-limiting connections based on the source IP, in addition to the regular bandwidth shaping features. With minimal effort you can configure an OpenBSD mail gateway or router to ensure that you waste as much of the spammers time as possible, while expending the least amount of your own effort and bandwidth.
I like the concept, but not that implementation. (Score:2)
But a legitimate contact makes a mistake typing the address and does send it to "george".
I would rather that it count the number of bad address attempts and blacklist the sender after X failures (5 for example).
But the failures would have to be counted as unique and across multiple connections. So resending to "george" 5 times won't lock them out. But making 5 connections with a single attempt to Al, then Bill, then Curtis, then Da
Re:Defeat "darkmail" through "greytrapping" (Score:2)
Three months and a total of 15 *total* spam messages have made it to my mail over that time period, which Spamassasin flagged and then Apple Mail's filtering dealt with accordingly. This is as opposed to about 750 per day on my two main accounts previously.
The beauty of greylists is that false positives are virtually unheardof (I support abo
and, apparently, darkmail is... (Score:2)
From the article:
Darkmail is primarily used in distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and directory harvest attacks (DHA) in which a specific domain is hit with a flood of emails through an alphabetical list of names.
But over the last year darkmail is being used to brute-force spam through filters and is clogging up bandwidth.
Basically, it seems that darkmail is bulk mail sent to a domain with the advance knowledge that much of it will not reach a destination.
Fad? Impossible (Score:1)
Been going on for years (Score:2)
There are ways around it.
1. If you're using SpamAssassin monitor what email addresses are getting hit as unknowns. If one gets say more than 20 hits add it to the blacklist to. That way if a real address gets the message and has one of those cc'd it will get tagged. I figured if they send to a common unknown it's probably safe to black
Soul? (Score:2)
From TFA, end of the fourth paragraph:
This clearly identifies the problem with most spam filters: they ain't got no soul.