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Encryption Security

Ask Slashdot: Is There a PGP Key Repository? 68

Posted by Cliff from the this-would-be-nice dept.
Martin Foster asks this question: "I noticed that a lot of Sites, such as Sendmail.org, Kernel.Org et cetera, sign all their downloads with a PGP Signature. While this is useful, getting a copy of this key can be a bit more difficult then it looks. For example, I have yet to be able to retreive the key from Red Hat's page. I had to look though the PGP Keyserver and guess which one was the correct one. Is there a site on the net that just stores such keys? Making it a central place to get any key needed to veryfy if a file is really as it seems?" A centralized, trustworthy place for downloading public keys seems to be a good idea. What do you all think?
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Ask Slashdot: Is There a PGP Key Repository?

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  • And PGP is widely used.
  • PGP does that.

    The problem isn't, btw, w/ folks randomly signing others' keys -- as long as they verified that the key really does belong to the person it's supposed to. I verify the fingerprints by phone; As long as people follow such precautions, there's no problem w/ signing as many keys as one likes.

  • RTFM (Score:1)

    by gavinhall ( 33 )
    Posted by FascDot Killed My Previous Use:

    Here's the URL http://www.nai.com/products/security/public_keys/p ub_key_default.asp

    But I have to wonder how you managed to install/use PGP without reading the instructions enough to know about the site.
  • Posted by FascDot Killed My Previous Use:

    Read the docs that came with your software.
  • Posted by InControl:

    There are two central pgp key servers. The first is ldap://certserver.pgp.com. The second is http://pgpkeys.mit.edu:11371. Either of these can be set to be automatically accessed by PGP6+ programs when an unknown key is found.
    There is a web interface to request a key as well, http://www.nai.com/products/security/public_keys/l ookup_key.asp

  • Perhaps you should gain an understanding of what these signatures mean before posting such comments. Cheers,
    --

  • This is what we need if PGP has to become more widely used!!!

  • There are plenty of sites that you can get public keys from. Of course, if you are going to place much trust in the key you still need to verify the key's fingerprint with the owner.

    I'm pretty sure nai runs a HKP (Horowitz Key Protocol) site as well as the silly web interface to get keys . . .

    Why would we need more servers?
  • pgp.net was set up for just this sort of thing.
    See pgp.net [pgp.net] for background info and a list of morror sites (or lookup the TXT RR for www.pgp.net for mirrors -- see wwwkeys.pgp.net for WWW access to to the distributed key servers).
    Note that none of the keys are in any way checked -- it is up to *YOU* to check the signatures, etc.

    On the other hand, "The Global Trust Register" [cam.ac.uk] does impart a warm glow ...
  • AOL on that.

    Unfortunately, too many signing keys for software distribution rely on massive key redistribution, instead of using the web of trust [cam.ac.uk].

  • I wonder...

    What do your fellas think?

    CP
  • One should really split this into two issues:
    * "certification" -- individuals and organizations
    should certify the PGP public keys of software
    authors based on various criteria; I sign people
    I know, others might sign people who they're
    willing to vouch for as good people, etc.

    * "distribution" -- getting people to upload
    their keys to a keyserver or other repository.
    This does *not* require any trust. One could
    run a slashdot key server, or use the existing
    key server infrastructure.


    Do not merge the functionality! Otherwise you'll
    end up with x.509. CAs, and all the attendant
    crap. PGP uses the web of trust for a reason.
  • So, once one separates key distribution from
    trust relationships, another interesting question
    comes up:

    Should I, as a user, sign the key of, say,
    Ben Laurie (apache-ssl, openssl guy), saying I
    know him (I'd say yes), and that he's generally
    a good guy?

    Or, is it more important that I sign the *code*
    also, saying I've reviewed it and it seems
    reasonable?

    I think people should do both -- I'd be far
    happier if there were signatures from everyone
    who seriously looked at the code for security
    purposes on the code they reviewed, rather than
    just on someone's key.

    These are really two separate problems, but both
    need to be solved.

    At MIT, Lenny Foner and others were working on
    a system to allow people to individually sign/audit small subsections of a large security
    program. This seems more reasonable than
    a system where people have to look at all the code, or sign none of it. As long as design
    is sufficiently encapsulated (ideal from a
    security perspective, but not always possible),
    it should be possible to review only a single module. A build system could then be constructed
    to require a threshold number of signatures from
    a set of people you trust, but not necessarily
    the same individuals reviewing the whole program.

    This is really the next step in cryptographic
    signatures -- "signature management" to go along
    with trust management. To do it, one would need
    a patched build system, and potentially also
    a standard for signatures and keys to include
    *why* they are being signed, not just that there
    is a valid cryptographic signature. I could
    sign an Anonymous Coward's code to assert I believe it is secure without knowing the identity
    of the Anonymous Coward. *This* is the main
    advantage of a decentralized freeform system like
    PGP (yay openpgp! yay gnupg!) over a rigidly
    enforced corporate hierarchy like x.509.

    Debian has gone far beyond most corporations in
    its use of PGP tools to verify developers (I think
    Red Hat has as well). This is the next step...

    1024D/4096g 0xD2E0301F Ryan Lackey
    B8B8 3D95 F940 9760 C64B DE90 07AD B307 D2E0 301F
  • I use GnuPG on a daily (exclusive) basis.
    It certainly has some reliability issues
    sometimes, far more than PGP, Inc.'s product.
    I've only had the system break during upgrades,
    and once it works it works quite well. The bugs
    are all very apparent to the user, like the thing
    just refusing to sign or use a key, rather than
    things which could open security holes.

    Overall, I'd be more comfortable using GnuPG,
    since I can easily audit the source (it's smaller
    and easier to understand), support the GPL,
    and tell people worldwide to use the same
    product, than using a PGP, Inc. product.

    Being a little bit on the edge to push a good
    thing like a GPL'd OpenPGP implementation is
    worth a bit of sacrifice, too.
  • This is what I was trying to stress. Have a central repository maintained by Redhat, where only corporations and/or organizations could put their public destributions keys. A nice central place to get all the keys you could want, while not having to sift though a large amount of keys and having to guess.

    But apparently everyone seems to beleive that I can't read a manual. Go figure.
  • I fully agree with you that PGP is based on trust. But on RedHat's offical page I have never been able to get their signature to be read correctly by PGP.

    So, I look at the key repository and find multiple keys (This can apply for most corporations or large organizations)... Which do I choose? They almost all look the same, and when I find one that matches, I notice subtle differences, probably based on the key not being updated.

    What I was thinking as a Central Repository maintained by let's say RedHat, who carry only the most recent and used destribution keys. Hit one site get what you need and leave. That's what I was implying, since it saves you from having to sift though identical keys and makes guesses.
  • Nice to see someone managed to get that right. I was not trying to make a complete fool of myself by asking this. I have PGP at home and use it, and sure I trust those who send me their keys.

    But I hate sifting though endless keys on the main keyservers in order to get a key I need. Specially when there are ambiguous names.
  • This is exactly what I was looking for. A place where I can get all the needed keys. It's not that I do not trust RedHat, just that I have never been able to get their signature to load up into my keyrings (states that no key exists). So getting it off a site that has it would be an asset... Especially if I can get keys for Kernel.org, RedHat, Debain, Sendmail, SSH et cetera, in one hit.

  • It seems that many of you have not fully understood the meaning of this question. What I was wondering, was a site where I could get all of the keys for Corporations or Organizations that I may be able to download code from.

    Let's say a repository that contains the destribution keys of RedHat, Kernel.Org, Apache, Debian, SSH et cetera. That way you connect to one site and retreive them, not needing to sift though all the keys on the repository (RedHat has quite a few and non matched the one on their WebPage).

    I know that there are repositories in place, and I have used them before. Heck my key is there too, but that does not deter the fact that a specialized site that is actively mantained (when a maintainer changes the key the old one gets removed) and remained secure.

    Though I must admit that only a site that most people would trust could be used. For example RedHat housing the repository on their servers, and making sure that it is not tampered though various security means.

    Like I said, I don't like to sift though endless keys that could possibly what I need. I would like to visite one site and get all of the destribution keys that I need.

    An analogy to this would be like going to a store that specialiases in books from a specific gendre, or going to Chapters (being the main repositories of today).
  • You *CLEARLY* have not read the documentation.

    The "Web of Trust" that keeps getting mentioned is not just some catch phrase we're bandying about. It is the mechanism by which we avoid the problems you're talking about of knowing which is the right key. That's the whole point of people being able to sign each other's keys. Let's say you have to decide on whether or not the key you downloaded was the right one, you'd want to start by looking at the names of the other people who signed the key that the document was signed with. If you don't know for sure that those are their keys, you can trace outwards further until you reach a signature used by someone you *do* know and trust.

    It sounds a little far fetched, but if you are a relatively widely recognized figure, you should get out there and try to exchange signatures with as many other widely recognized people that you trust as you can deal with. I know it sounds irrational to try to find an associative link between yourself and various software developers, yet people play "Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon" (or whatever it's called) all the time. It's not as hard as it looks.
  • Yeah, but which version(s): 2.6.2foo, 5, 6, or whatever the "current" version is these days?
  • MIT has a PGP key server [mit.edu] written by Marc Horowitz [mit.edu] that has a fairly large collection of keys. (The server seems to be under the weather right now which just goes to show the problem with single point of failure).


    It does no certification, just distribution, but you can add your key and check others quite easily.
  • He wasn't saying "I'm an ignorant user who doesn't know what keyservers are"

    He wasn't saying "I don't know how cryptographic trust relationships work"

    He wans't saying "The PGP web of trust doesn't work"

    I believe what he was trying to say was "Wouldn't it be nice if someone compiled and published a keyring with signing keys of some of the major distributions and packages?"

    That someone would need to be more or less globally known and trusted in the Open Source world and sign that keyring.

  • A copy of the PGP key is on every CD pressed, on the FTP site, and at http://www.redhat.com/corp/corp_contact.html
  • You trust them to write the software, so you might was well trust them with the keys.

    I have to say, RTFM. This repository is mentioned in the man pages for pgp.
  • If you are looking for a way to ensure the RPM is signed by the person who was supposed to sign it, go to RedHat Contrib|Net (RHCN) [redhat.com]. RHCN maintainers post their keys there when they register and you can download the public key and make sure that the package is signed by the actual maintainer. Of course, you still have to trust that maintainer, but with RHCN in addition to the usual PGP web of trust you also get additional assurance:
    1. RHCN verifies the e-mail address (as usual, by sending the password there)
    2. You can see when the person signed up. If the person was a maintainer for a long time and maintains lots of useful packages, it gives some reasons to believe that [s]he is not just some kid trying to give you a trojaned software.
  • This is more a comment on most of the messages
    in this ridiculous thread than the starting
    message.

    The whole point with PGP is *trust*.
    It doesn't matter where you get the keys,
    what matters is who signed them, whether they
    are reliable people, and whether you trust
    them.

    PGP is not yet another cool whistle to add your
    machine, it's either something you want, and then
    you'd better learn to use it correctly, or
    something you don't have to care about at all.

    Besides, it only protects you against some
    tampering on the way. If the basic archive
    machine gets broken somehow, the magic potion
    won't work, as the recent incident with the linux
    security server distribution amply demonstrates.
  • SSN? Driver's license #? Credit Card #? Password to a system you want to send to someone but want it protected?

    Your statement is uncredible. You may choose to not send your private data over public networks at this time, but that does not mean you don't have any data that needs that level of encryption. Put all this info in a message on /. if you really mean it (might want to include your phone number, address, dob, bank account numbers, etc)...

  • I got the kernel 2.2.x and there were keys there two. I downloaded the keys, and the kernel, but what do I need the key for? What do I do with that key anyway? Do I really need to downlaod the key? I did not need it to untar the file, or compile the kernel, what is it for then? Anyone shed some light on this for me?
  • Isn't there a problem with lots of people all randomly signing each others' keys?

    It becomes a nightmare trying to backtrace all signatures back to a key you know is trustworthy

    - Is there any software to do this? ie If you tell it who you trust/know, something that will follow all links to tell you if you can trust a particular signed key?
  • I hope you were being slightly sarcastic :)

    I meant there is an interlinked network of people who have signed each others' keys.

    Of course they have to verify fingerprints before signing, pref. by face to face contact, but over the phone is okay if you know that person.

    The random bit is the *network* of interlinked signatures ( - this is obvious, you cannot expect to know who on the internet knows each other beforehand).
  • I didn't know this - Cool
  • Something like this has been implemented - the clever bit is that it's a book, which has some advantages for the truely paranoid.
    URL: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/Security/Trust-Re gister/

    Alex
  • www.usenix.org
  • There are many plugins that come with PGP to make it automatic. Microsoft Outlook, Eudora and most of the major email programs (and possible Netscape) use PGP plugins to recognize if you are sending information to a user who is in your keyring. If they are, it will encrypt the message and send it on it's way. Except for a click of an OK button...everything is automated ad you don't have to a thing.
  • True, centralized institutions are efficient, but that kind of defeats the purpose. You shouldn't accept someone's key without trusting them, which means you should get it from them over a channel by which you know it was not altered. That means a digital signing scheme which pre-supposes having their key.

    Here is the way it's supposed to work -- you get someone's key personally (on a diskette, or whatever) or it is transmitted to you and signed by someone you already know or trust. Kind of a six degrees type deal. This creates a "web of trust". If I remember, in PGP, you can specify the level to which you trust a key, which means some keys can be trusted enough to authenticate other keys.

    Hmmm, maybe six-degrees should be the one managing PGP keys... What'dya think?
  • Comment removed based on user account deletion
  • don't recognize sarcasm when it bites you in the ass huh?
  • I chaired a two day conference on this very topic in Vienna last year. See the results at http://www.bests.org/
    The "independance" of the registration authourity is the main point in question:

    Businesses don't trust Government to do it, Government doesn't trust businesses and the individual consumer trusts neither!

    AC
  • I think you have either missed the point (even if it was badly put), either that or you are being plane argumentative.

    Tell me, do you lock your door to the house? Do you lock your car door (if you don't have one, please imagine you do)

    My point is this. Just because it is possible to get in to the house, even with the door locked, you don't leave it open, as a form of discouragement, to try and make it harder for some one to break in to your house. There is no such thing as a 100% secure system, none. But you can make that system as hard to break in to as possible.

    I think this is one thing that people should realise. It is all more of a deterent then a 100% garantee of protection.

    Does any one dissagree?
  • I think this is the problem, yours are not random verifications. You have puposely spoken to the owner of the key before signing it to make sure it is representing who it says it is.

    The other writer (I am assuming) is saying that people are signing keys with out actually verifying that the key belongs to who ever.

    Don't ask me why some one may wish to do this, it is beyond me (well okay, I can think of some reasons, but no point in saying).
  • Yep, semi sarcastic : )

    Oh, and I can't spell so leave me alone.

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