Managing Shared Passwords? 18
"I'm curious what other folks have done. I know I could create a database and store all these things in there, but I'm not real happy about storing a database of passwords in case that box gets cracked (internally, which has happened to several servers already -- and it looks like one of the new businesses that Big Corporation bought is doing a little espionage), or in case one of the hardware guys finds it. (The corporation demands that hardware work be done by the hardware guys, OS work by the OS guys, and us application guys deal with applications.) The OS guys are comfy not knowing root, but I frankly don't trust some of the hardware guys, who will be the ones taking the boxes offline at regular intervals for preventive maintenance. The OS guys all rely upon phyisical access to the box, and they keep a sheet of paper locked up with all the passwords scribbled on it.
I've also considered a Palm Pilot db, with encryption, but the ones I've tried all are aimed at personal password management, and some are cranky about being beamed around, even with L0pht's beamcrack.
Password safe (Score:3)
Have one password for the Password Safe and have it store the root passwords for your other computers. If you are very paranoid, keep the database on a floppy and lock the floppy in a safe when not in use.
One downside, only Windows. But, a Linux version is coming Any Day Now (tm) (it'll be Open Source to boot!).
Dave
sudo won't do? (Score:1)
Yes, su can simulate users other than root, but that doesn't seem to be what you're interested in.
Re:why not sudo? (Score:1)
Please. Try doing something like this in a large many host real unix server enviroment with a missmatch of server types and os's. It isn't practical. It isn't real. Having a "Rescue" kit laying around is even more dangerous than having a root password. How easy is it to copy a cd or a floppy? How easy is it to login to a machine via ssh from a secure trusted host and then sudo or su root commands?
One time passwords (Score:2)
The system has a root password (which everybody that needs access can know). When you log in, you're presented with a phrase. On
So, no matter who's sniffing, anybody can see the exchange, but the password remains private. Do a search for "S-key" or "one time password".
Personally, I don't see what's wrong with require SSH. That
Keyring for PalmOS (Score:3)
It used to be called GNU Keyring. I use it all the time. It's quick, stable, open source and all that other good stuff. It generates passwords for you based on settings you pick and works for encrypting notes as well.
That way you don't have to worry about your hardware guys sticking a disk in a password server and brute-forcing any data.
Before I had a Palm I used GPG to encrypt passwords. That's a decent solution, too, as long as you don't save a text version anywhere on your computer. I was also using loopback encryption for certain directories in my home directory. That way, even my private key, all of my encrypted passwords, and anything else sensitive is encrypted. If you're ultra-paranoid and you're the only user of your computer, you can loopback encrypt
Re:boot/root disks (Score:1)
Re:boot/root disks (Score:1)
why not sudo? (Score:4)
In case you haven't heard of it before, sudo is a SUID program that gives you root access (or restricted root access, e.g., the ability shutdown the system or mount/umount disks, but no more) once you authenticate yourself with *your* password. You never use the actual root password.
Sudo also logs all commands executed. This can save you a *lot* of grief when you're trying to figure out what you did wrong.
Since each person must be named explicitly in a separate control file, it's easy to invalidate users as circumstances change. It's a lot easier to change one file on multiple systems than it is to get everyone to memorize new passwords.
As for the root password, I've found it unnecessary to provide *any* root password - just put a "*" in the
If you want to keep a root password around anyway, it should never be routinely used. I personally favor the "write it on a card, put it in a sealed envelope, and (optionally) lock in in your boss's desk. Once you use it once, generate a new random password and repeat" approach.
As others pointed out, none of this will stop anyone from getting into the system their own root disk. But if fear of immediate termination doesn't scare them off, it's easy to remove the floppy and CD-ROM drives.
PGP (Score:2)
If however, you still feel that it is necessary to have the root passwords avaliable frequently you probably want to use PGP or GPG. Each person will have their own key/password to access the encrypted file. This makes it so that the "meta-password" is not shared and eliminates the need to publically post any changes to the passwords since they will always be found in 'the usual place'. You will also have the ability to easily add or remove people from the list to which the password list is encrypted. Overall, the safest way in which a database of passwords could be kept on the computer.
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Re:why not sudo? (Score:2)
I'm curious as to why you say this. It would seem to me that it's much easier to physically secure a machine in the DMZ than it would be to secure it from network attacks. If you don't keep your servers in a locked server room you need some serious help.
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I think alot of people missed the point! (Score:1)
Post-It notes? (Score:1)
Seriously though, how about going a non-password route? Biometrics comes to mind, or those credit card type login cards. Any other similar solutions I'm missing? This would allow you to forget passwords altogether while still leaving the security in-tact. If you think that such a solution is a little too complex/over budget/etc. I would go the encrypted database route (just don't use rot-13!)
Go Low Tech (Score:2)
This sort of thing is desirable for disaster recovery, anyway--I keep a copy in the company safety deposit box, in addition to the one on-site. It's not particularly good to write passwords down, anywhere, but I'm in a similar situation and there are enough of them that there just isn't much choice. But far better to keep them off-line than use some of the techie solutions presented here. They're not susceptible to remote compromise and there's little chance of your piece of paper head-crashing or getting zapped with static electricity and losing all the information.
Re:why not sudo? (Score:1)
He did not say why sudo won't work. Maybe he just doesn'r understand what sudo is capable of.
Use SSH Keyrings (Score:1)
Leknor
boot/root disks (Score:1)
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Kenny Sabarese
Left Ear Music
AIM: kfs27
irc.openprojects.net #windowmaker
Re:boot/root disks (Score:1)
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Kenny Sabarese
Left Ear Music
AIM: kfs27
irc.openprojects.net #windowmaker
Mix of the above (Score:1)
This may cost more than some other ones, but I see it as secure and (relatively) practical. Go out to Business Despot and buy a zip drive, a cheap monitor, and a fire safe. Go to you local used computer shop (I'd go to Tottenham Court Road here in London) and buy a basic (like P133) spec computer, whith like 128 megs of RAM. Set up the machine with a root password that you tell the hardware guys, but keep all the passowrds on the Zip disk (PGP'ed if you want, but kept in the fire safe). Use all that RAM you've got to create a 64 meg RAM disk, and set all the temp dorectories to exist on the RAM disk. That way, the hardware guys can do what they want, but only you guys have the code to the safe (with the Zip of passwords in it). Needless to say this machine would be sepaerated from the network by the old two-inches-of-concrete trick (AKA put in a spare closet).
If you'e really paranoid, you could load the entire system into another RAM disk, booting the machine off a LAN (which would be made up of the password computer and another whose only purpose is to be booted and insatlled off of and would remain locked in a box).
If you wanna go one step farther, link the safe with the Zip disk in it to a mechanical device that dials your cell phone number if the Zip disk is out of the safe for too long and tells you the ID code the guy that opened the safe used (which he would have had to punch in as well as the safe code). And you could have that link to the combonation used to open the door to the room, ad infinium...fun with security - when you realize the only "secure" way to keep the passwords is to make them somthing simple and unguessable like " " or "foo."